hot-spot dominated for the next five decades by over-mighty subjects such as Juan Manuel and Prince Ferran (1329-1363), the royal infante important in Aragonese and Castilian affairs until mid-century.
15
The immediate lurch into a general state of war between Castile and Aragon in 1356 took place after five years of deepening tension. Though accepting the young Castilian king, Pedro I (1350-1366/69) as "a brother whom we greatly love and prize," Pere III of Aragon (1336-1387) soon came to distrust his royal counterpart as a provacateur willing to use anyone or anything to have his way. 16 Distrust gave way to war in August, 1356 when Catalan privateers captured two Piacenzan merchantmen which stood at anchor in the Castilian port of San Lucas de Barrameda. Since Piacenza was allied to Genoa which had been at war with Aragon for two years, the Catalan captain felt that the two vessels were legitimate prizes.
17
Unfortunately, Pedro did not share this opinion.
Within days of the incident, Pedro had written a scathing letter accusing the Castilian attack after another, but never forgot this burning desire to unleash "cruel war" on his "principal adversary."
As year after year of intermittent conflict slowly passed away, one personage at least, the pope, attempted to establish peace with the Christian portions of the Iberian Peninsula.
After the establishment of a truce in the spring of 1357 and its rapid violation by Pedro, a papal legate took the process back to the drawing-board and, by May, 1361, led Aragonese and Castilian negotiators to agree to a treaty at Terrer. This "final, loyal, and true peace" was in effect for less than a year when the Castilian king again acted to overturn it. 
19
Castilian garrisons and settlers in captured Aragonese and Valencian outposts lost confidence in their king's ability to protect them and began to return to their homeland.
58
Following hard on these desertions, Pere's subjects who had lost their homes because of the Castilian conquests began to stream back across the frontiers to reclaim them. 59 As was so often the case in such situations, the return of the natives caused legal complexities over property titles and municipal jurisdictions that would not be resolved for years. or part of a conscious strategy for political dominance. 64 What the historical record points to, however, is that the Castilian king, after long years of what he considered as national and personal betrayal, stood out as a "fierce spirit more inclined to rigorous vengeance than to clemency," 65 This royal personality trait may not have come to dominate the Castilian body politic as it did, but for the brutalizing effect of the war on a monarch who seemed to see traitors in every class of his subjects. These, then, were the years in which Pedro executed his own brother, Fadrique, and his principal adviser, Gutier Fernandez de Velasco, for the unsubstantiated charge of conspiring with the Aragonese. 66 It was also the era in which
Pedro executed garrison commanders such as Juan Alfonso de Benavides after surrendering helplessly surrounded outposts after holding off enemy attacks for weeks on end. 67 While an argument (however weak) could be advanced that these deaths were necessary to maintain order and contribute to the war effort, the non-judicial murder of Prince Ferran's mother and brothers as well as Enrique's younger brothers can only be attributed to the king's desire to avenge himself on his dangerous rivals whom he seemed unable to harm personally, no matter how hard he tried.
68
The many episodes of day-to-day cruelty associated with war served as a backdrop of the king's individual acts of brutality. In the last Orihuela campaign of 1365, for example, Pedro ordered his soldiers to "wage the cruelest war they could, cutting off the heads of everyone you capture, so that there will be no man of Aragon taken who is not killed." 69 As if to obey his own bloody command, Pedro had the crews of five captured Catalan galleys involved in harrying the Cartagena littoral during the same year executed to the last man-a clear affront to the international laws of war.
70
In logical terms, such rampant cruelty should have forcefully propelled Pedro to seek out an ultimate decision on the battlefield. When he did not do so, contemporaries, most especially his Aragonese adversary, attributed this strange turn of events to either divine or psychological causes. Pere, who from the beginning of the Castilian conflict claimed that he was fighting a just war, was certain that he would prevail over his enemy ("that wicked and false traitor") who would be "put to shame and covered with confusion." With a dearth of unprejudiced evidence in this regard, it is truly impossible to determine whether the Castilian king, shaken by a base fear of either his enemies or his own troops, purposefully fled from situation that might have led to battle or he had begun to learn some of the defensive lessons his Aragonese adversaries had mastered years before.
77
The military portrait of Pere, like that of his opponent, changed drastically as the war progressed. From a rather timid defensive martial administrator through the later 1350s, the Aragonese king, at least through the image left in his chronicle, seemed during the 1360s to become an offensive warrior who was ever ready to embrace the dangers of the battlefield. he felt that his cause was just and God would allow him to act as His tool in the punishment of the king of Castile Pere then had to convince his polyglot force that it was unified in its allegiance to him and to the glorious aim he had announced. He then gave the Castilians serving with him the right to cross over and join Pedro's army if they so wished. With these emotional words, he unified his forces in a way worthy of his famous ancestor, Jaume I. 82 Ibid., 2:559-61, 563-64 (VI:48-49, 51). Pere described the camp organization in the following way: (1) with a first blast of the trumpets, the soldiers would feed and ready their mounts for the day's march, (2) at the second, they themselves would eat breakfast, (3) at the third, the soldiers would gather their weapons and stand ready to advance, and (4) with the fourth, they would mount and follow the king.
had shown up Pedro as a coward. 
VI.
In reality, the martial stance of the Aragonese king to that of Castile during the long war named after them by later historians represents both a personal and professional relationship. Both were drawn to the battlefield by motivations that modern historians would characterize as psychological-Pedro to avenge a wrong or set of wrongs that he and his people had long harbored against their eastern neighbor and Pere to finally live up to the reputation of his glorious reconquest ancestors. In assessing their willingness to engage in battle, their ties to the knowledge of professional soldering each had gained as a war leader has to be taken into account. In most of the conflict, Pedro had shown himself to be a daring leader of men who often split his forces and struck where least expected. As the war years wore on, however, he seemed to honor caution over boldness and this surely explains 84 Ibid., 2:561 (VI:49).
85 Ibid.
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the ragged nature of his last campaigns in the war with Aragon and in the civil war (1366-1369) with Enrique de Trastámara. For Pere, on the other hand, the conflict with Castile was simultaneously a matter of regnal survival and military attainment. By supervising and financing an extremely complicated defense, he made his frontiers difficult zones to conquer and hold. In the last years of the struggle, however, he seemed to abandon caution at the very instant that his adversary was adopting it. The War of the Two Pedro, it seems, had as deep an effect on its commanders and their psyches as it did on the lands they ruled.
